~ MathDefs
\newcommand{\zo}{\{0,1\}}
\newcommand{\getsr}{\leftarrow_{\text{\tiny R}}}
\newcommand{\E}{\mathbb{E}}
\newcommand{\N}{\mathbb{N}}
~
_CS 127: Cryptography / Boaz Barak_
# Homework 2
Total of 128 points.
## Exercises from Lecture 3
1. (impossibility of statistically testing randomness, 15 points) Let $T_1,\ldots,T_M:\zo^n\rightarrow\zo$ be a collection of function that are supposed to be statistical tests for randomness. Prove that if $n$ is large enough and $M<2^{100n}$ there exists a distribution $X$ that passes all these tests but is very far from the uniform distribution. Concretely, show that
there exists a random variable $X$ over $\zo^n$ such that:
* For every $i\in [M]$, $| \E[ T_i(X)]-\E[T_i(U_n)]|<0.001$ where $U_n$ is the uniform distribution over $n$ bits.
* But, there exists some $T^*:\zo^n\rightarrow\zo$ such that $| \E[ T^*(X)] - \E[T^*(U_n)] |>0.999$.
(No points, just food for thought.) Based on this exercise, what do you believe can we say about a distribution $X$ if it passes the FIPS 140-2 testing suite for randomness?
2. (20 points) We call a sequence $\{ X_n \}_{n\in\N}$ where $X_n$ is a distribution over $\zo^n$ \emph{pseudorandom} if it's computationally indistinguishable from the sequence $\{ U_n \}$ where $U_n$ is the uniform distribution over $\zo^n$. Are the following sequences pseudorandom? prove or refute.
a. (10 points) $\{ X_n \}$ where $X_n$ be the following distribution: we pick $x_1,\ldots,x_{n-1}$
uniformly at random in $\zo^{n-1}$, and let $x_n$ be the parity (i.e. XOR) of
$x_1,\ldots,x_{n-1}$, we output $x_1,\ldots, x_n$.
b. (10 points) $\{Z_n \}$ where for $n$ large enough, with probability $2^{-n/10}$ we output an $n$ bit string encoding the text \texttt{''This is not a pseudorandom distribution''} (say encode
in ASCII and pad with zeros), and with probability $1-2^{-n/10}$ pick a random string. For
$n$ that is not large enough to encode the text, $Z_n$ always outputs the all zeroes
string.
3. (24 points) Suppose that $G:\zo^n\rightarrow\zo^{3n}$ is a secure pseudorandom generator. For each one of the constructions $G^1,G^2,G^3$ below either prove that they are necessarily a secure pseudorandom generator or give a counterexample (which is a construction, based on the Cipher, PRG or PRG conjectures, of a generator $G$ such that $G_i$ would not be secure.)
a. (8 points) $G^1(s)=G(s)_{1,\ldots,2n}$ (i.e., the first $2n$ bits of $G(s)$).
b. (8 points) $G^2(s)=G(0,s_2,\ldots,s_n)$ (i.e., the output of $G(s)$ but setting the first seed bit to zero)
b. (8 points) $G^3(s_1,\ldots,s_n)=G(s_n,\ldots,s_1)$ (i.e., the output of $G(s')$ where $s'$ is obtained by reversing $s$).
## Exercises from Lecture 4
4. (24 points) In these three questions you'll show that if we have
a pseudorandom function family with particular input and output sizes, we can easily obtain a
family that handles different inputs and outputs.
a. (Padding inputs and outputs, 8 points) Suppose that $\{ f_s \}$ is a pseudorandom function collection where for every $s\in\zo^n$, $f_s$ maps $\zo^n$ to $\zo^n$. Prove that if we define $f'_s$ to be function that on input $i\in [2^{n/2}]$ outputs the first bit of $f_s(2^{n/2}+i)$ then $\{ f'_s \}$ is a pseudorandom function collection (with one bit output).
b. (Increasing output size, 8 points) Prove that if there exists a collection $\{ f_s \}$ where $f_s:\zo^{|s|}\rightarrow \zo$ (i.e., one bit output), then then there exists a collection $\{ f'_s \}$ with $f'_s:\zo^{|s|}\rightarrow\zo^{|s|}$. See footnote for hint.[^hint-prf-expand]
c. (Changing PRFs input size, 8 points) Prove that if there exists a collection $\{ f_s \}$ of pseudorandom functions with $f_s:\zo^{|s|}\rightarrow\zo^{|s|}$ then there exists a collection $\{ f'_s \}$ with $f'_s:\zo^{*}\rightarrow\zo^{|s|}$ (i.e., $f'_s$ for a random $s\in\zo^n$ is indistinguishable from a random function from $\zo^*$ to $\zo^n$. (If it makes your life easier, it's fine to construct a collection $\{ f'_s \}$ with a single output bit.)
[^hint-prf-expand]: First come up with a pseudorandom family with output longer than $1$ but shorter than $|s|$. For example, if $s \in \zo^{n^2}$ then the output can be $n$. Then show that existence of PRF implies existence of pseudorandom generators and use that to expand your output.
5. (20 points) Suppose that $\{ f_s \}$ is a collection of secure pseudorandom functions where $f_s$ maps $\zo^{|s|+1}$ to $\zo$. For each of the following constructions $f^1$,$f^2$ below of function collections mapping $\zo^{|s|}$ to $\zo^2$, either prove that they are necessarily secure or show a counterexample (i.e., a construction of PRF's $\{ f_s \}$ based on the PRF conjecture such that the corresponding construction $f^i$ is insecure)
a. (10 points) $f^1_s(x)=f_s(0\circ x) \circ f_s(1\circ x)$
b. (10 points) $f^2_s(x)=f_s(0\circ x) \circ f_s(x\circ 1)$
6. (25 points) For the sake of this question, let's say that a pair of algorithms $(S,V)$ is an _enhanced message authentication code_ if it is a secure message authentication code (as per the definition given in the lecture notes) with the following addition--- in the attack game Mallory is given not just oracle (i.e., black box) access to the signing oracle $S$ but also to the verification oracle $V$. That is, Mallory can put forward a pair $(m,\sigma)$ to the oracle and find out whether or not the pair passes verification. Prove that every $(S,V)$ that is a secure message authentication code is also an enhance message authentication code.